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CASE NOTES
Civil Procedure-FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 68-WHEN
IT COMES DOWN TO COSTS, IT'S NOT How YOU PLAY THE GAME, IT'S
WHETHER YOU WIN OR LOSE-Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 101
S. Ct. 1146 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938,1 a system was established in the federal courts to allow a
party defending a claim to propose a settlement by offering to al-
low judgment to be taken against it.2 This procedure, adopted from
the law in force in several states, is governed by Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The purpose of Rule 68 is to avoid costly and protracted litiga-
tion by encouraging settlement of lawsuits prior to trial.5 Under
the rule, a defendant who recognizes the merits of the plaintiff's
claim may make a formal offer of judgment to the plaintiff as the
basis for terminating the litigation.7 The offer must be made at
1. 28 U.S.C. app. at 388 (1976).
2. FED. R. Cir. P. 68.
3. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3001 (1973).
4. FED. R. Cv. P. 68. Rule 68 provides:
Offer of Judgment. At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a
party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to al-
low judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect
specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of
the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either
party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of ser-
vice thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted
shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a
proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is
not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after
the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not
preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been
determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the lia-
bility remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable
may make an offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made
before trial if it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to
the commencement of hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
(emphasis added).
5. Advisory Comm. Notes on FED. R. Civ. P. 68, 28 U.S.C. app. at 499-500. 12 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 3.
6. Id. at n.7. The term "defendant" includes a plaintiff defending against a counterclaim.
7. Id. at § 3005. A written notice of acceptance and proof of service may be filed by
either party together with the offer, which allows the clerk to enter judgment as provided in
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least 10 days prior to trial8 and include payment of the plaintiff's
costs up to the date the offer is made.9
The benefits of the rule may be substantial to a defendant-of-
feror in the event that the offer is rejected by the plaintiff. By the
terms of Rule 68, a plaintiff who rejects an offer of judgment and
subsequently recovers an amount less than the amount of the offer
is required to pay the defendant's costs from the date the offer was
made. 10 A correct assessment of the plaintiff's potential recovery
and an offer of judgment tailored to that assessment may indem-
nify the defendant-offeror for the costs of going to trial.1 If the
plaintiff rejects the offer based on an optimistic assessment of po-
tential recovery, the defendant is not forced to pay the price for
the plaintiff's error in judgment.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE
In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 2 a sharply divided United
States Supreme Court held that the benefits of Rule 68 do not in-
ure to defendants who make an offer of judgment which is rejected,
if the judgment is entered in favor of the defendant.' s Under this
decision, in order to be able to recover costs14 from the plaintiff-
offeree under the rule, the defendant must lose the case and judg-
ment must be entered for the plaintiff in an amount less than the
defendant's offer. 15 This note will examine the Court's reasons for
excluding from the benefits of Rule 68 defendants who, after hav-
ing an offer of judgment rejected by the plaintiff, put on a vigorous
and successful defense. It will be suggested that in doing so, the
Court has made a policy decision to dilute the effectiveness of Rule
68 by lessening the pressure placed upon plaintiffs to accept the
defendant's pre-trial economic analysis of the case.
Rosemary August (plaintiff) filed a complaint against Delta Air
Lines, Inc. (defendant), alleging that her employment was unlaw-
the offer.
8. E.g., Greenwood v. Stevenson, 88 F.R.D. 225, 226 (D. R.I. 1980).
9. Maguire v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 181 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 1950).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
11. See, e.g., Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchman's Union, Local 30, 86 F.R.D. 500 (N.D.
Cal. 1980).
12. 101 S. Ct. 1146 (1981).
13. Id. at 1150.
14. The court noted that nq issue was presented as to what was included in recoverable
costs. 101 S. Ct. at 1149 n.6.
15. Id. at 1149-50.
CASE NOTES
fully terminated because of her race. 6 In response to August's
claim for $20,000 plus attorney fees and costs, the defendant filed
an offer of judgment under Rule 68 for $450.17 The plaintiff re-
jected the defendant's offer, and when the case went to trial, judg-
ment was entered for the defendant.18 The trial judge, in exercising
his discretion under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, directed that each party pay its own costs.1" Upon motion of
the defendant to modify the judgment in order to allow it to re-
cover costs under the provisions of Rule 68, the trial judge held
that Rule 68 was subject to a reasonableness requirement and that
since the defendant's offer was not reasonable, recovery of costs
was not mandatory.20 The decision was upheld by the Seventh Cir-
cuit, which further conditioned the application of Rule 68 on the
amount of the offer bearing a reasonable relationship in amount to
the issues, litigation risks, and expenses involved and anticipated.1
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed, but rejected the no-
tion that Rule 68 was subject to a reasonableness requirement. 2
Relying on "the plain language, the purpose, and the history of
Rule 68, ' '23 Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, 4 held that
the rule was not designed to encompass cases in which the defen-
dant-offeror prevailed. The Court held that the rule "is simply in-
applicable to this case because it was the defendant that obtained
the judgment. ' 25
16. Id. at 1148.
17. id.
18. Id.
19. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 21 F.E.P. Cases 640 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See FED. R. Civ.
P. 54(d). But See note 64 infra and accompanying text.
20. 21 F.E.P. cases at 640. For a discussion of the reasonableness requirement and an
argument in support of it, see, Note, Rule 68: A "New" Tool for Litigation, 1978 DUKE L.J.
889.
21. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1979).
22. 101 S. Ct: at 1151.
23. Id. at 1149.
24. Although the vote was 6-3, Powell, J., concurring in the result only, stated:
I agree with most of the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice
REHNQUIST, and do not agree with the Court's reading of Rule 68. It is anomalous
indeed that, under the Court's view, a defendant may obtain costs under Rule 68
against a plaintiff who prevails in part but not against a plaintiff who loses
entirely.
.101 S. Ct. at 1155.
25. Id. at 1150.
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III. APPLICATION OF RULE 68
In Staffend v. Lake Central Airlines, Inc.," the purpose and ef-
fect of Rule 68 was clearly announced:
Rule 68 is intended to encourage early settlements of litigation. It
is also intended to protect the party who is willing to settle from
the burden of costs which subsequently accrue. The provision in
the rule which imposes costs upon a party who refuses an Offer of
Judgment and who later recovers no more than the offer also puts
teeth in the rule and makes it effective by encouraging
acceptance.2
A line of cases suggests the rule has met with considerable judicial
hostility attributable to the coercive impact of the rule on pre-trial
decisions of plaintiffs. Furthermore, courts have held that strict
compliance with the technical terms of the rule is required of de-
fendants who seek to employ the rule's mandatory cost shifting
provision. In Maguire v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp.,8 the court
held that an offer to compromise which provided for a cash pay-
ment equal to the amount subsequently recovered by the plaintiff,
but which did not meet the technical requirements of the rule, was
not an offer of judgment within the meaning of rule 68.2 Similarly,
where the defendant fails to state that the offer was served more
than 10 days before the trial and the record does not reflect that it
was served at all, the offer will not entitle the defendant to costs
under Rule 68.80
It is well recognized that Rule 68 encourages settlement before
trial by holding the threat of costs over the plaintiff's head."1 In
Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local 30,82 the court
26. 47 F.R.D. 218 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
27. Id. at 219-20. Staffend involved a request by the plaintiff to hold the offer of judg-
ment made by the defendant in absence pending the outcome of defendant's motion to
dismiss the plaintiff's second cause of action. The court held that it could not extend the 10-
day period for acceptance of the offer provided in Rule 68.
28. 181 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1950).
29. Id. at 322. The plaintiff alleged the offer in the complaint and the defendant admit-
ted it in the answer. Nonetheless, the court held that this did not waive the formal require-
ments of the rule.
30. Home Ins. Co. v. Kirkevold, 160 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1947).
31. Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 110, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1979); accord, Mr. Hanger,
Inc. v. Cut Rate Plastic Hangers, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). The Mr. Hanger court
held that Rule 68 "is designed to induce or influence a party to settle litigation and obviate
the necessity of a trial." 63 F.R.D. at 610.
32. 86 F.R.D. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
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observed:
An offer of judgment imposes upon the offeree the choice of ac-
cepting the offer within 10 days or assuming the risk that the out-
come of the case will be less favorable than the offer, on pain of
having to pay the costs subsequently incurred by the offeror. The
rule is intended to be coercive.88
Thus, when strategically utilized by a defendant, the rule plays a
significant role in the economic decision by the plaintiff whether to
settle or continue litigation.84 In so doing, the rule serves the eco-
nomic interests of the parties and the courts." As one district
court judge has noted, "The Rule attempts to minimize the eco-
nomic burden of litigating a case to the bitter end by facilitating
an acceptable compromise at some earlier point."8  The public's
interest is also served since the public "must provide the resources
for disposition of the controversies that are not settled. '8 7
Whether Rule 68 applies to prevailing defendants apparently has
not been expressly considered by the federal courts before August.
As noted by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion, however,
those courts which have been faced with post-trial motions by a
prevailing defendant to recover costs under Rule 68 have con-
cluded such recovery is permissible.88 Thus in the federal courts,
the implicit rule has been that prevailing defendants are entitled
to costs under Rule 68. This position has found support in at least
one state court which operates under an offer of judgment rule
33. Id. at 502.
34. The rule has been characterized as "a formidable settlement tactic." Greenwood v.
Stevenson, 88 F.R.D. at 226. For a discussion of the economic calculations that enter into a
settlement decision, see R. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 21.4 (2d ed. 1977).
35. "The purposes of the Rule are to encourage settlements, thereby avoiding the ex-
pense to the parties and the court of protracted litigation . 88 F.R.D. at 228.
36. Id.
37. Simonds v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 480 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (D. Mass. 1979). So
convinced of the importance of settlement was the court in Simonds that it directed the
parties to confer on the issue using as a guideline a draft settlement procedures and order.
Those procedures involved an award of a liquidated amount, representing nontaxable costs
and litigation expenses, in addition to the judgment if the amount of the judgment varied
by 25% over or under the losing party's final settlement offer. It is worth noting that the
proposal would have awarded the liquidated sum to the defendant if the plaintiff obtained a
judgment in an amount less than 75% of the defendant's final offer or if judgment was
entered for the defendant. 480 F. Supp. at 1261-63.
38. 101 S. Ct. at 1161 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Dual v. Cleland, 79 F.R.D. 696
(D. D.C. 1978); Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Cut Rate Plastic Hangers, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 607 (E.D.N.Y.
1974); Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local 30, 86 F.R.D. 500 (N.D. Cal.
1980)).
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adopted verbatim from the federal rule. In Wright v. Vickaryous0
the Alaska Supreme Court held:
Wright contends that Civil Rule 68 does not apply since it oper-
ates only when the offeree obtains judgment in his favor. That
interpretation would mean that when an offeree prevails, but his
judgment does not exceed the offer, he will be penalized, but if he
does not prevail at all no penalty will be imposed. We see nothing
to recommend such a result .... 40
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE August OPINION
The majority opinion in August may be characterized as resting
on a three-legged stool. The legs are comprised of the plain lan-
guage, the history, and the purpose of Rule 68.41 The opinion's rea-
soning, however, is hardly sturdy and is sharply criticized in a dis-
sent by Justice Rehnquist which suggests that Rule 68 must be
read "woodenly and perversely" to reach the majority's
conclusion."
As originally adopted in 1938, Rule 68 provided, "If the adverse
party fails to obtain a judgment more favorable than that offered,
he shall not recover costs in the district court from the time of the
offer but shall pay costs from that time."43 That sentence was de-
leted when the rule was amended in 1948 and was replaced by two
sentences which provide, "If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay
the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an
offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent
offer."44
In August, Justice Stevens declared that the phrase "judgment
obtained by the offeree," does not include judgments obtained by
the offeror:
[I]nasmuch as the words "judgment obtained by the of-
feree"-rather than words like "any judgment"-would not nor-
mally be read by a lawyer to describe a judgment in favor of the
39. 611 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1980).
40. Id. at 23.
41. 101 S. Ct. at 1149.
42. Id. at 1164 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 483 (1946).
44. Id.
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other party, the plain language of Rule 68 confines its effect to
the second type of case-one in which the plaintiff has obtained a
judgment for an amount less favorable than the defendant's set-
tlement offer."5
The original version of Rule 68 did not include the "judgment
obtained by the offeree" language upon which the Court so heavily
relies.46 Indeed, as Justice Stevens noted, the original version was
drafted with several state offer of judgment statutes in mind.47 The
Advisory Committee notes cited three state statutes in particular
"as illustrations of the operation of the rule."' 8 As Justice Rehn-
quist stated in his dissenting opinion, "These three statutes, like
the original Rule 68, all mandated imposition of costs on a plaintiff
who rejected an offer of judgment and later failed to recover a
judgment more favorable than the offer."'49 Each of the cited state
statutes also did not include "judgment obtained by the offeree"
language and utilized language plainly consistent with the notion
that prevailing defendants are included within the rule.50
The Advisory Committee notes to the 1948 amendment indicate
that the change, which provided the "plain language" utilized by
the Court, was intended "to make clear that evidence of an unac-
cepted offer is admissible in a proceeding to determine the costs of
the action but is not otherwise admissible. '51 The two new
45. 101 S. Ct. at 1149-50.
46. See note 43 supra.
47. 101 S. Ct. at 1152 (footnote omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1160 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
50. In pertinent part those statutes provided:
2 MINN. STAT 9323 (Mason 1927) provided: "At least ten days before the term at
which any civil action shall stand for trial the defendant may serve on the adverse
party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him . . . and if a more
favorable judgment be not recovered no costs shall be allowed, but those of the
defendant shall be taxed in his favor."
4 MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 9770 (1935) provided: "The defendant may, at any
time before trial or judgment, serve upon the plaintiff an offer to allow judgment
to be taken against him ... and if the plaintiff fail [sic] to obtain a more
favorable judgment, he cannot recover costs, but he must pay the defendant's
costs from the time of the offer."
§ 177 N.Y.C.P.A. (Cahill 1937) provided: "Before the trial, the defendant may
serve upon the plaintiff's attorney a written offer to allow judgment to be taken
against him. . . but, if the plaintiff fail [sic) to obtain a more favorable judgment,
he cannot recover costs from the time of the offer, but must pay costs from that
time."
101 S. Ct. at 1152-53 n.19.
51. 5 F.R.D. at 483.
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sentences were designed to "assure a party the right to make a sec-
ond offer where the situation permits, ' 2 such as in the event of a
new trial being ordered after a judgment for the plaintiff in the
original trial is nullifed." The Advisory Committee notes make no
mention of any intent of the drafters of the amendment to limit
the circumstances under which a defendant is entitled to recover
costs under the rule. As a result, Justice Rehnquist observed that:
The operation of Rule 68 was not intended to change when this
part of the Rule was amended in 1948 to its present form. The
Advisory Committee notes to the 1948 amendment explain the
reasons for the amendment-none of which give any indication
that Congress decided to take away the benefits of the Rule to a
defendant who made a Rule 68 offer but later prevailed on the
merits."
The majority opinion also attempts to find support for its inter-
pretation of Rule 68 in the writings and remarks of the commenta-
tors. These citations, however, make as strong a case against the
Court's position as they make for it.56 Indeed they appear to sup-
port Justice Rehnquist's observation that the Court's opinion to-
tally ignores "the common sense maxim that the greater includes
the lesser . . . ." Far from supporting the Court's construction of
the "plain language" of the rule, the commentators relied upon by
Justice Stevens at best suggest ambiguity in the application of the
rule to prevailing offerors."
The Court's analysis does not rest exclusively on the plain mean-
ing or history of Rule 68. The Court also looks to the purpose of
the rule, which, it declares, "is to encourage the settlement of liti-
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 101 S. Ct. at 1160 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
55. Justice Stevens relies on C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, and the remarks of a
member of the Advisory Committee. 101 S. Ct. at 1153-54.
56. The passage from Wright and Miller cited by Justice Stevens includes language such
as, "If the offer is not accepted, and the ultimate judgment is not more favorable than
what was offered, the party who made the offer is not liable for costs accruing after the date
of the offer." 101 S. Ct. at 1153 n.24 (emphasis added). The italicized language is reasonably
susceptible of being interpreted in a manner contrary to the Court's opinion since a judg-
ment for the defendant certainly is less favorable than any positive offer previously
declined.
57. 101 S. Ct. at 1158 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. Justice Rehnquist takes note of the Court's reliance on the commentators and ob-
serves that they "either do not support its position or simply fail to address it." 101 S. Ct. at
1161 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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gation."" This analysis is undertaken by reading Rule 68 in con-
cert with Rule 54(d). 0 Justice Stevens observed that since a pre-
vailing defendant-offeror would have the presumption of Rule
54(d) operating to award costs anyway, the operation of Rule 68
under that circumstance "would provide little, if any, additional
incentive [to settle in advance of trial] if it were applied when the
plaintiff loses." 1 It must be noted, however, that in the very case
under consideration by the August Court, the trial court exercised
its discretion to deny costs to the prevailing defendant.2
Nonetheless, the Court suggested that to interpret Rule 68 in a
manner which would allow a prevailing defendant's nominal settle-
ment offer to remove the discretion of the district court "would
require us to disregard the specific intent expressed in Rule 54(d)
and thereby to attribute a schizophrenic intent to the drafters."63
In suggesting that Rule 54(d) discretion should not be disturbed by
Rule 68, the Court overlooks the observation made by Justice
Rehnquist that by its terms Rule 54(d) does not operate as a pre-
sumption "when express provision therefor is made either in a
statute of the United States or in these rules . .. ."" Thus, Jus-
tice Rehnquist opined, Rule 68 does no more than provide an ex-
press exception of the sort apparently contemplated in Rule 54(d).
"Contrary to the view of the Court, I think that Rule 68 and Rule
54 are entirely consistent with one another when read in a manner
faithful to their actual language .... "
Moreover, in rejecting the Seventh Circuit's analysis of the case,
which applied a reasonableness requirement to the rule,6" the
Court declared that since under its interpretation of the rule plain-
tiffs must obtain a judgment in order for the rule to operate, un-
reasonably small offers would serve no purpose7
If the Court had in mind a nominal offer which appears to fall
far short of the plaintiff's claim, such an analysis would deprive
59. 101 S. Ct. at 1150.
60. 101 S. Ct. at 1149. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) provides in pertinent part: "Except when
express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules,
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs."
61. 101 S. Ct. at 1150.
62. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
63. 101 S. Ct. at 1150.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
65. 101 S. Ct. at 1161 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
67. 101 S. Ct. at 1151-52.
1981]
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defendants the opportunity to assess the plaintiff's claim and, if
the defendant decided the claim was of nuisance value, to respond
with a nominal offer designed to avoid the cost of litigation. In
other words, if the defendant determines that the plaintiff has very
little chance of success, it still might be reasonable to make a mini-
mal offer in hopes of settling the case and avoiding costs which, at
the trial court's discretion, might not be recovered.
Viewed in this light, the defendant's offer in August may well
have represented a careful legal and economic analysis of the
plaintiff's claim. Indeed, although it is admittedly more visible
with the advantage of hindsight, any offer made by a defendant
who properly analyzes a case and expects to ultimately prevail if
the case goes to trial is not only reasonable, it is economically
sound." If Rule 68 does apply to a defendant who expects to pre-
vail, an offer of judgment becomes even more appealing since the
rule will provide insulation from costs if the defendant's assess-
ment of the plaintiff's claim is accurate.
Thus, although the Court's analysis concludes that applying
Rule 68 in the case of a prevailing defendant provides little, if any,
incentive for a defendant to settle the case,69 that analysis denies
the practical effect and advantage conferred by the mandatory
cost-shifting aspect of Rule 68. At a time when the capacity of the
judiciary is being severely taxed,7 0 it would seem unreasonable to
dismiss a plausible interpretation of a federal rule which could
contribute to the goal of judicial economy.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in August gives an interpretation
to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which finds
weak support at best in the plain meaning, purpose, and history of
the rule. Although the Court suggests that its interpretation of
Rule 68 avoids an irreconcilable inconsistency with Rule 54(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it seems clear from the lan-
guage of Rule 54(d) that no such inconsistency exists. Moreover,
by excluding prevailing defendants from the benefits of Rule 68,
68. It may be observed that even with the benefit of the Court's interpretation of Rule
68, a plaintiff who loses at trial is out costs in addition to taking nothing from the defen-
dant. Any compensation received in the form of a settlement offer places the plaintiff in a
better position.
69. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
70. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
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the Court restricts the scope of the rule and thus removes an in-
centive for some defendants to make settlement offers. Since set-
tlement of litigation would help ease crowded court dockets, the
Court's decision may be viewed as having an adverse impact on the
legal system by not fully utilizing the pro-settlement aspects of
Rule 68.
ROBERT L. ROTHMAN
